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ARTICLE

Customary International Law and Private Rights of Action
Curtis A. Bradley*
It has been twenty years since the US Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
issued its landmark decision in Filartiga v Pena-Irala.' In upholding federal court
jurisdiction over a suit between aliens concerning violations of international human
rights standards in a foreign country, the court in Filartigapaved the way for modern
international human rights litigation. As Professor David Bederman has observed,
"[iln a sense, all current human rights litigation owes its fortune to Filartiga."2
Since Filartiga,US courts have been confronted with two waves of international
human rights litigation. The first wave has primarily involved suits, like Filartigaitself,
between aliens concerning alleged human rights abuses occurring outside the United
States. This wave has been moderately successful. While enforcement ofjudgments is
often a problem in these cases, many courts have at least been receptive to hearing the
plaintiffs' claims. In recent years, litigants have increasingly attempted to apply the
principles developed in this first wave litigation to suits against domestic defendants.
This "second wave" litigation has been much less successful than the first wave. More
importantly, the failure of this litigation-especially in cases involving US plaintiffshas the potential to unravel some of the successes achieved in the first wave. To
understand this point, some background is necessary.

Professor, University of Virginia School of Law. Thanks to Jack Goldsmith and David Sloss for
helpful comments. A version of this paper was delivered at the 94th Annual Meeting of the
American Society of International Law.
s. 630 F2d 876 (2d Cir 1980).
*

2.

David J. Bederman, Dead Man's Hand: Reshuffling Foreign Sovereign Immunities in Human Rights

Litigation,25 GaJ Ind & Comp L 255, 256 (1995).
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I. STATUS OF CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW

There are two principal types of international law-treaties and customary
international law. International human rights litigation has not primarily involved
treaty claims. There are of course many treaties today that govern human rights, but
the United States either has not ratified these treaties, or it has declared them to be
non-self-executing-that is, not enforceable in US courts until implemented by
Congress. Consequently, international human rights litigation in the United States is
primarily based on claims under customary international law-the law that "results
from a general and consistent practice of states followed by them from a sense of legal
obligation."
The text of the Constitution says little about the domestic status of customary
international law. It says a number of things about the status of treaties-in
particular, it tells us that they are part of the supreme law of the land and that federal
courts may hear cases arising under them.4 The only reference in the Constitution to
customary international law, however, is a grant of statutory power to Congress to
define and punish offenses against customary international law (referred to at the time
of the founding as part of the 'law of nations"). 5
In several decisions in the 19th and early 20th centuries, the Supreme Court
referred to the law of nations as "part of our law" or "part of the law of the land."6 In
practice, courts treated customary international law as general common law-a
background source of law for federal and state courts in the absence of any federal or
state legislation to the contrary. Federal court interpretations of this general common
law were not binding on the state courts, and claims arising under this general
common law did not fall within the federal question jurisdiction of the federal courts.7
In Erie Railroadv Tompkins," the Supreme Court held that federal courts were no
longer free to apply general common law-the choice was either federal law or state
law.9 On the same day it decided Erie, however, the Court held that for some issues it
is appropriate for federal courts to create federal common law-common law that is
truly federal in that it is binding on the states and provides a basis for federal question
3. 1 Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations § 102(2) (1987).
4. See US Const Art VI, d 2 ("[All Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of

the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land."); US Const Art IIL § 2, cl1 ('The
judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under... Treaties.").
s. See US Const Art I, § 8, cl10 ('The Congress shall have Power... [t]o define and punish ...
Offences against the Law of Nations.").
6. See The Paquete Habana, 175 US 677, 700 (1900); Hilton v Guyot, 159 US 113, 163 (1895); The
Nereide, 13 US (9 Cranch) 388,423 (1815).
7. See, for example, Ker v Illinois, 119 US 436, 444 (1886); New York Life Ins Co v Hendren, 92 US (2
Otto) 286,286-87 (1875).
S. 304 US 64 (1938).
9. Id at 78.
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jurisdiction."0 The Supreme Court has not had occasion since Erie to resolve the status
of customary international law. There is dicta in the Supreme Court's Sabbatino
decision" that could be read as endorsing a federal common law status for customary
international law, 2 but that was not the holding of the Court; indeed, the Court in
Sabbatino refused to apply in that case customary international law governing
expropriation of foreign citizen property.
In 1980, however, the Second Circuit held in Filartiga that customary
international law has the status of post-Erie federal common law. 3 As such, cases
arising under customary international law, the court said, fell within the federal court
jurisdiction allowed by Article III for cases "arising under ... the Laws of the United
States."' 4 On that basis, the court held that it was constitutional for federal courts to
exercise jurisdiction over tort claims based on customary international law even when
the parties are not diverse. A number of other lower federal courts have since agreed
with Filartiga on this point, and several of these courts have even described the
proposition that customary international law has the status of federal common law as
"settled."16
This conclusion can be challenged on a number of grounds,' but that is not my
focus here. My focus is instead on whether customary international law confers an
individual right to sue in US courts, also known as a "private right of action." It is
worth noting, however, that some of the arguments that have been made against

federal common law status for customary international law-such as the argument
that the federalization of such law is properly a task for the elected political branches
rather than the courts, and the argument that the political branches have implicitly
precluded such federalization in the human rights area by virtue of the limitations
they have imposed on human rights treaties-turn out to be relevant to the private

right of action issue as well.

See Hinderliderv La PlataRiver & Cherry Creek Ditch Co,304 US 92, 110 (1938).
11.See Banco Nacional de Cuba v Sabbatino,376 US 398 (1964).
12. Id at 425-26.
13. See Filartiga,630 F2d at 886.
14. US Const Art III, § 2.
lo.

15. Filartiga,630 F2d at 886. The court based statutory jurisdiction on the Alien Tort Statute, 28 USC
§ 1350 (1994), which is discussed below. See text accompanying notes 25-28.
16. See, for example, Kadic v Karadzic, 70 F3d 232, 246 (2d Cir 1995); In re Estate of Marcos, Human

Rights Litigation, 25 F3d 1467, 1473 (9th Cir 1994); Xuncax v Gramajo, 886 F Supp 162, 193 (D Mass
1995).
17. See Curtis A. Bradley and Jack L. Goldsmith, Customary InternationalLaw as Federal Common Law: A
Critique of the Modern Position, 110 Hav L Rev 815 (1997); Curtis A. Bradley and Jack L. Goldsmith,
FederalCourts and the Incorporationof InternationalLaw, 111 Harv L Rev 2260 (1998).
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II. THE PRIVATE RIGHT OF ACTION ISSUE
Even if customary international law is federal law, this does not mean that it
necessarily confers a private right of action. Not all federal law, even federal
constitutional law, carries with it a private right to sue." Former Judge Bork was the
first to highlight this potential limitation on the Filartigaapproach. In a concurrence in
a 1984 DC Circuit decision, Tel-Oren v Libyan Arab Republic, 9 he noted that according
federal common law status to customary international law does not establish that,
'like the common law of contract and tort, for example... individuals [have] the right
to ask for judicial relief "' For a variety of separation of powers and international law
reasons, Bork argued that it was in fact inappropriate for courts to imply such a
private cause of action under customary international law. Among other things, he
noted that the political branches rather than the courts have principal responsibility
for foreign relations issues, that the domestic implementation of international law is
generally governed by domestic rather than international law, and that even the
international law governing human rights does not generally purport to require private
civil remedies.
Judge Bork's argument generated substantial concern in the human rights
community, and it was heavily criticized by international law commentators.2' There
was sufficient concern about the argument that in 1991 Congress was persuaded to
enact the Torture Victim Protection Act ("TVPA"). 2 By its terms, this statute
creates a private right to sue in US courts for claims of torture and extrajudicial
killing, subject to a statute of limitations, an exhaustion requirement, and other
provisions. The legislative history of the statute makes clear that it was in part a
response to Judge Bork's concurrence in Tel-Oren.2' The TVPA covers only torture
and extrajudicial killing committed under "actual or apparent authority, or color of
law, of any foreign nation," and thus does not apply to actions by US officials.
Importantly, however, its cause of action is available to both domestic and foreign
plaintiffs. As noted in the legislative history, the TVPA was designed to provide "a
dear and specific remedy, not limited to aliens, for torture and extrajudicial killing." 4
18. Consider Erwin Chemerinsky, FederalJurisdiction§§ 6.3.3, 9.1 (Little, Brown 3d ed 1999).
19. 726 F2d 774 (DC Cir 1984).
20.
Id at 811 (Bork concurring).
21. For criticism of Judge Bork's reasoning. see, for example, Anthony D'Amato, What Does Tel-Oren
Tell Lawyers?Judge Bork's Concept of the Law of Nations isSeriously Mistaken, 79 AmJ Intl L 92 (1985);
Harold Hongju Koh, Transnational Public Law Litigation, 100 Yale L J 2347, 2382-86 (1991);
Kenneth C. Randall, Federal Questions and the Human Rights Paradigm, 73 Minn L Rev 349, 397-99
(1988).
22. See Torture Victims Protection Act, Pub L No 102-256, 106 Stat 73 (1991), codified at 28 USC §
1350 (1994).
23. See HR Rep No 102-367, 102d Congress, 1st Sess 4 (1991).
24. Id at 3 (emphasis added).
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The TVPA does not apply to claims based on conduct other than torture or
extrajudicial killing. As a result, the problem highlighted by Judge Bork is still relevant
to cases not involving such conduct. Some courts have addressed this problem by
holding that another statute, the Alien Tort Statute ("ATS"), creates a private right of
action. This statute, which was enacted in 1789 as part of the first Judiciary Act,
states that "[t]he district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action by an
alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the
United States."' There are many reasons to question the conclusion that this statute
creates a cause of action, including the statute's plain language, which is phrased in
purely jurisdictional terms; the historical context in which the statute was enacted,
which long predated modern notions of both international human rights law and
federal common law; and the failure of any court to read it this way for approximately
two hundred years.' In addition, reading the ATS as creating a cause of action would
mean that claims could be brought under non-self-executing treaties, since the statute
refers not only to the law of nations but also to treaties of the United States. It is wellsettled in US law, however, that individuals do not have the right to sue under nonself-executing treaties.' While Congress can certainly enact legislation implementing a
non-self-executing treaty, it would be difficult to construe the ATS as implementing
non-self-executing treaties ratified hundreds of years after the ATS's enactment.
In any event, the ATS has a major limitation built into its scope: it applies only
to suits by alien plaintiffs and thus cannot be relied upon to create a right to sue in
cases brought by US plaintiffs. As noted, most of the initial cases brought under the
Filartigaprecedent were alien-against-alien suits. In recent years, however, a number of
international human rights suits have been brought against domestic defendants. This
"second wave" litigation can itself be divided into two categories: suits by
alien
plaintiffs and suits by domestic plaintiffs. Although the ATS can potentially be
invoked in the first category of second wave cases, the plaintiffs in those cases often
have encountered other barriers to suit. Plaintiffs have encountered even greater
difficulties in the second category of second wave cases. In those cases, plaintiffs
cannot rely on the ATS, so they must look elsewhere for their cause of action.

See, for example, Abebe-Jira v Negewo, 72 F3d 844, 847 (11th Cir 1996); In re Marcos, 25 F3d at
1474-75; Xuncax, 886 F Supp at 179; see also Tel-Oren, 726 F2d at 779 (Edwards concurring).
26. 28 USC § 1350.
25.

27.

28.

See Curtis A. Bradley and Jack L. Goldsmith, The Current Illegitimacy of InternationalHuman Rights

Litigation,66 Fordham L Rev 319, 357-63 (1997).
See, for example, Foster v Neilson, 27 US (2 Pet) 253, 313-14 (1829); Goldstar (Panama)SA v United
States, 967 F2d 965, 968-69 (4th Cir 1992); US v Postal, 589 F2d 862, 875-76 (5th Cir 1979).Judge
Bork pointed out this anomaly in his concurrence in Tel-Oren.See 726 F2d at 820. At least one court
has attempted to avoid this anomaly by implying the cause of action from foreign tort law rather
than from the ATS. See In re Estate of Marcos, Human Rights Litigation, 978 F2d 493, 503 (9th Cir
1992).
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III. CATEGORY A: SUITS BY ALIEN PLAINTIFFS

There have been a number of cases in recent years in which alien plaintiffs have
sued domestic defendants for violations of international human rights law, including
several cases brought against US corporations. In this category of second wave cases,
the plaintiffs can invoke the Alien Tort Statute, which, as noted above, has been held
by some courts not only to confer statutory jurisdiction but also to create a cause of
action. One might assume, therefore, that these suits would be as successful as the
alien-versus-alien cases described above. In fact, with rare exceptions,2 these suits have
failed.
These suits have encountered a variety of doctrinal and procedural barriers. As in
first wave litigation, the plaintiffs are generally disallowed in these cases from bringing
claims directly under human rights treaties because the United States either has not
ratified them or has declared them to be non-self-executing. In addition, courts have
held that customary international law cannot be applied by US courts when there is a
controlling executive or legislative act to the contrary." Courts also have been strict
about the requirements for pleading and proving the international law violations.
Furthermore, they have applied domestic law restrictions, such as statutes of
limitation and the act of state doctrine, to bar the international law claims. 3
In sum, although there are a variety of specific reasons why courts have rejected
claims in this context, it appears that, in general, courts are more resistant to allowing
international human rights claims when they are brought against domestic
defendants. As discussed below, this resistance has been most pronounced when the
suits have been brought by domestic plaintiffs. In that context, Judge Bork's
arguments in Te-Oren-although they have had little purchase in first wave
litigation-are proving to be influential.

See, for example, Jama v INS, 22 F Supp 2d 353 (D NJ 1998) (allowing ATS suit to proceed against
federal immigration officials in their individual capacities).
30. Non-self-executing treaties may still have some relevance in these cases, most notably through the
Charming Betsy canon of construction, pursuant to which courts are to construe federal statutes,
where reasonably possible, to avoid conflicts with international law. See, for example, Ma v Reno, 208
F3d 815 (9th Cir 2000); Mariav McElroy, 68 F Supp 2d 206, 231 (E D NY 1999); Mojica v Reno, 970
F Supp 130 (ED NY 1997). See also Murray v The Schooner CharmingBetsy, 6 US 64, 118 (1804)

29.

31.

32.

33.

(stating that "an act of congress ought never to be construed to violate the law of nations, if any
other possible construction remains").
See, for example, Gisbert v United States Attorney General,988 F2d 1437, 1447 (5th Cir 1993); GarciaMir v Meese, 788 F2d 1446, 1453 (11th Cir 1986). See also The Paquete Habana,175 US at 700.
See, for example, Beanal v Freeport.McMoran,Inc, 197 F3d 161 (5th Cir 1999); Ralk v Lincoln County,
81 F Supp 2d 1372,1379-83 (SD Ga 2000).

See, for example, Roe v Unocal Corp, 70 F Supp 2d 1073 (C D Cal 1999) (dismissing based on act of
state doctrine); Iwanowa v Ford Motor Co, 67 F Supp 2d 424 (D NJ 1999) (dismissing because of
statute of limitations).
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IV. CATEGORY B: SUITS BY DOMESTIC PLAINTIFFS
There have been several recent international human rights cases brought by US
citizens against domestic defendants. These cases have involved claims concerning
unauthorized medical experiments conducted on state prisoners and patients,M and
the improper use of force to restrain a state criminal defendant.' 5 Because the plaintiffs
in these cases were not aliens, they could not invoke the ATS as a basis for their cause
of action. And, in each of these cases, courts have held that there is no private right of
action under customary international law. In other words, they have in effect accepted
Judge Bork's argument in Tel-Oren. These courts have offered several reasons for their
conclusion.
First, the Supreme Court has held that private rights of action should not be
implied under domestic law when there are "special factors counseling hesitation"-for
example, if the right of action issue raises difficult policy questions best left for
Congress in the first instance.' Courts have reasoned that, if anything, this separation
of powers concern is higher with respect to cases involving international law issues,
since foreign affairs matters are particularly the province of the legislative and
executive branches of government. It is these branches, the courts have said, that
should determine how international law should be enforced within the United States.
As one court explained (and other courts have quoted), "To imply a cause of action
from the law of nations would completely defeat the critical right of the sovereign to
determine whether and how international rights should be enforced in that

municipality."'

Second, courts have noted that there are extensive domestic remedies available
for abusive actions by federal and state officials-such as the remedies available under
the civil rights statute, 42 USC § 1983; under the Federal Tort Claims Act; and under
state tort law. Indeed, US officials have themselves referred to these remedies as a
reason for not enacting legislation to implement the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights ("ICCPR"). Such domestic remedies similarly reduce the need,
courts have reasoned, for implying private rights of action under customary
international law.
Third, courts have reasoned that Congress already looked at the issue of a right
to sue under customary international law when it enacted the TVPA, and it codified
34. See Heinrich v Sweet, 49 F Supp 2d 27, 43-44 (D Mass 1999); White v Paulsen, 997 F Supp 1380,
1386 (E D Wash 1996).
35. See Hawkins v Comparet-Cassani,33 F Supp 2d 1244 (CD Cal 1999).
36. See, for example, Schweiker v Cbilicky, 487 US 412, 421 (1988) (quoting Bivens v Six Unknown Named
Agents of the FederalBureau of Narcotics,403 US 388, 396 (1971)).
37. Handel v Artukovic, 601 F Supp 1421, 1428 (CD Cal 1985). This statement is quoted in two of the
recent second wave decisions, Hawkins, 33 F Supp 2d at 1256 and White, 997 F Supp at 1385.
38. See S Exec Rep 102-23,102d Cong 14-15 (1992).
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only torture and extrajudicial killing, not other customary international law claims. By
implication, the courts have said, Congress has not approved private rights of action
under other customary international law claims. As one court explained, "the fact that
the relief authorized by Congress is not coextensive with the right at issue does not
mean this Court should not show deference to Congress's balancing of the policy
considerations underlying its action."
Fourth, courts have sought to avoid allowing litigants to circumvent limitations
imposed by the US treatymakers. Many of the customary international law rights
asserted in US courts are also reflected in human rights treaties, either because the
treaties codified customary international law or because the customary international
law has been derived in part from the treaties. To the extent that the United States
has ratified these treaties, it has consistently declared their substantive provisions to be
non-self-executing-that is, not enforceable in court unless and until Congress passes
implementing legislation.40 As a result, courts consistently have disallowed private
claims under these treaties.4 If courts concluded that customary international law
conferred a private right of action, litigants would be able to do an end run around this
case law and, more importantly, the actions of the US treatymakers.
In my view, these arguments against implied rights of action under customary
international human rights law are persuasive. I would add one additional, somewhat
technical argument: the lack of a private right of action under customary international
law helps explain why almost no court has allowed customary international law to
serve as the basis for jurisdiction under the general federal question jurisdiction
statute.42 As noted above, courts have said that customary international law has the
status of federal common law. In addition, the Supreme Court has held that claims
arising under federal common law can fall within the 'laws... of the United States"
referred to in the federal question jurisdiction statute.43 Yet almost no court has based
its jurisdiction over customary international law claims on this statute; instead, they
39. White, 997 F Supp at 1384.
For a discussion of the validity of this and other limitations placed by the President and Senate on
US ratification of human tights treaties, see Curtis A. Bradley and Jack L. Goldsmith, Treaties,
Human Rights, and ConditionalConsent, 149 U Pa L Rev (forthcoming 2000).
41. See, for example, Iguarta de la Rosa v US, 32 F3d 8, 10 nl (1st Cir 1994) (voting rights under the
ICCPR); Sandbu v Burke, 2000 US Dist LEXIS 3584 (SDNY 2000) (extradition under the
Convention Against Torture); Ralk, 81 F Supp 2d at 1380-83 (prison treatment under the ICCPR);
Calderon v Reno, 39 F Supp 2d 943, 956 (ND Ill 1998) (extradition under the Convention Against
Torrure);Jama, 22 F Supp 2d at 362 (asylum under the ICCPR); White, 997 F Supp at 1387 (prison
medical experiments under the ICCPR and the Convention Against Torture); In re Cheung, 968 F
Supp 791, 803 n17 (D Conn 1997) (extradition under the ICCPR and the Convention Against
Torture); Domingues v Nevada, 961 P2d 1279 (Nev Sup Ct 1998) Ouveniles death penalty under the
ICCPR).
42. See 28 USC § 1331 (1994) ("The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions
arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.").
43. See Illinois v Milwaukee, 406 US 91, 98-100 (1972).

40.
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have based jurisdiction, if at all, on the ATS. Moreover, several courts have expressly
rejected the argument that customary international law creates a basis for jurisdiction
under the federal question jurisdiction statute.44 One potential explanation for this
rejection is that customary international law does not have the status of federal law.
To date, however, most courts have held that it does. An alternate answer is that, as
the recent second wave cases have held, customary international law does not create a
private right of action. The Supreme Court has held that a federal law issue in a case
generally will not be enough to satisfy the federal question jurisdiction statute unless
the federal law creates a cause of action.45
V. CONCLUSION

In sum, there have been two waves of international human rights litigation.
The first wave, inspired by Filartiga, has involved suits between aliens concerning
conduct outside the United States. This litigation has been moderately successful.
The second, more recent wave has involved suits against US defendants. This wave
has been extremely unsuccessful, especially when the plaintiffs have been US citizens.
These conflicting results may not sit well together. Among other things, it is likely to
seem anomalous to courts that alien plaintiffs have substantially greater rights than
domestic plaintiffs to invoke international law in the United States-and to utilize
the resources of the backlogged federal court system-just as it seemed anomalous to
Congress when it enacted the TVPA. In addition, some of the reasons courts are
giving for rejecting an implied right of action in cases brought under the second wave,
such as the desirability of leaving these issues for Congress in the first instance, the
negative implications of the TVPA, and the concerns about litigants doing an endrun around the actions of the US treatymakers, are also reasons to question the
allowance of cases under the first wave.' Thus, ironically, by bringing international
human rights litigation "home," its proponents may in fact be undermining it.

44. See, for example, Princz v Federal Republic of Germany, 26 F3d 1166, 1176 (DC Cir 1994); Xuncax, 886

F Supp at 193-94; Handel, 601 F Supp at 1426. Other courts have delicately avoided the issue. See,
for example, Kadic, 70 F3d at 246; Filartiga,630 F2d at 887 n22; Burger-Fischerv Degussa AG, 65 F

Supp 2d 248,273 (D NJ 1999).
See Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticalsv Thompson, 478 US 804,812 (1986).
46. See discussion above and Bradley and Goldsmith, 66 Fordham L Rev at 367-68 (cited in note 27).
45.
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